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STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 2 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12 2 
v i 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(a)-3. 
This is an appeal from a final Order in the Third District Court of Salt Lake Count). State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FINDING THAT APPELLEE WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS, NOR MAINTAINED 
MINIMUM CONTACTS IN THE STATE OF UTAH, SUFFICIENT TO CONFER 
GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FINDING THAT UTAH'S LONG ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-27-
24 (1996), DID NOT CONFER SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEE. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 Herhertson v. WilloMcreek Plaza. 895 
1
 As in Herhertson. here the trial court considered more than just the pleadings 
making his determination and therefore, the ruling is best characterized as a grant of summary 
judgment. 
1 
P.2d 839. 840 & n.l (Utah 1995). In reviewing a motion for summar} judgment, this court will 
consider "all of the facts and evidence presented, and even reasonable inference arming therelrom. 
in a light most favorable to the part} opposing the Motion."* Katzenherger r Stale. 735 P.2d 405. 
408 (Utah 1987). Further, because summar} judgment presents only questions of law. this court 
accords no deference to the trial court's ruling and reviews it for coiTectness. Mimiiord v ITT 
Commercial Fin. Corp.. 858 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Statutes and Rules are determinative of the questions at issue in this appeal: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2): 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24: 
Any person ... whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; ... 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
2 
Plaintiff Appellant Chris Buddensick brought this action in the Third Judicial District 
Court to reco\ er compensation for injuries she sustained as a result of a slip and fall accident at the 
StateLine Hotel and Casino in Wendover. Nevada. She filed a Complaint which was not answered 
by Defendant/StateLine. Instead, StateLine filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds and for the 
reason that Utah Courts lacked specific and general personal jurisdiction over its Hotel and Casino. 
Defendant argued the District Court did not have jurisdiction under Utah's "Long Arm Statute". 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24, nor did the Court have general personal jurisdiction over StateLine 
Hotel and Casino, as it was not "doing business" in Utah and did not have sufficient minimum 
contacts with the State. Plaintiff argued that Defendants contacts with Utah, and the fact it was 
doing business within the State, were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Although the Court 
found there were business contacts in Utah as outlined in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, the Court granted Defendant's Motion and dismissed this action finding there were not 
sufficient minimum contacts nor was Defendant doing business, sufficient to confer specific and/or 
general personal jurisdiction. (See Exhibit "C") 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND DISPOSITION 
1. On or about July 29, 1996, Appellant was in Defendants' StateLine Casino buffet 
restaurant for the purpose of eating a meal. StateLine employees had completed preparing the buffet 
and had just opened it for the public. Appellant was the second or third person in line at the buffet. 
Appellant, while proceeding through the buffet line, slipped on a substance that was on the floor, 
causing Appellant to fall. 
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2. As a result of the accident on July 29. 1996. Ms. Buddensick suffered serious 
personal injuries which required extensive medical care. 
3. On January 17. 1997, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County. (R. 1-4) 
4. On March 17, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based on 
lack of jurisdiction. (R. 14-16) 
5. On June 30, 1997, a hearing was held before Judge William A. Thorne to argue 
Defendant's Motion. The Court granted an evidentiary hearing to take place after discover}* had 
been completed on the limited issue of StateLine's business activities in Utah. (R. 269) 
6. Discovery revealed that Defendant advertises its hotel and casino in Utah; contracts 
for goods and services in Utah; owns stock in a Utah Corporation, StateLine Properties, Inc.: leases 
from StateLine Properties, and has leased for many years, two parcels of property in Utah foi parking 
lot. parking structure and signage purposes, relating to Defendant's hotel and casino business; leases 
and has leased for many years, at least three other parcels located in Utah; maintains at least three 
post office boxes in Utah, one of which Defendant shares with StateLine Properties; is a party to 
numerous other lawsuits pending in Utah; has a Utah cellular telephone number, regular phone 
number and six Utah fax numbers. 
7. Nearly every agreement entered into by Defendant, including the leases and contracts 
noted above, show that they were executed and notarized in Salt Lake City, Utah. The documents 
were also drafted by a Utah attorney. 
8. On September 15, 1997, the evidentiary hearing was held with Honorable William 
A. Thorne to argue Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint. (R. 270) 
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9. On October 8. 1997. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order was entered 
in this matter b\ Judge Thorne dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. (R. 247-252) 
10. On October 22. 1997. Plaintiff Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 253-254) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the trial court's ruling dismissing Appellant's complaint for 
lack of general and specific jurisdiction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's Complaint, because StateLine has 
engaged in substantial and continuous local activity, and in doing so, should have reasonably 
expected to be hailed into a Utah Court, thus creating general personal jurisdiction. 
11. The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's Complaint for lack of specific personal 
jurisdiction. Appellant went to the Appellees' premises due to Appellees' advertising activities in 
the State of Utah. Therefore, the injuries Appellant suffered were the result of Appellees' contacts 
with Utah and Utah's Long Arm Statute Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-24 confers jurisdiction over 
Appellees. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
IN FINDING THAT APPELLEE WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS, NOR 
MAINTAINED MINIMUM CONTACTS IN THE STATE OF UTAH, 
SUFFICIENT TO CONFER GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 
When a motion for lack of jurisdiction is submitted, a Plaintiff need only make a prima facie 
showing to establish jurisdiction over a Defendant. Neways. Inc. v. McCauglan. 950 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1997). Here, more than a prima facie showing was made by Plaintiff. 
"General personal jurisdiction over a party results when the party has contacts in the forum 
state and those contacts are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic."" Alexander v. Circus 
Circus Enter.. Inc. 939 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks. 
Ltd.. 796 F.2d 299,301 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Haisten v. Grass Vallev Med. Reimbursement Fund. 
784 F.2d 1392,1396 (9th Cir. 1986))): see also Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft Corp.. 578 P.2d 
850, 853 n.6. (Utah 1978).2 
At the evidentiary hearing before the trial court, Plaintiff made a clear showing that 
Defendant transacts sufficient and indeed substantial business in the State of Utah and/or there are 
other grounds for the Court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (See Exhibit 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court in Abbott distinguished between general personal 
jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. The court explained that general personal 
jurisdiction results from doing business, which required substantial and continuous activity 
Abbott. 578 P.2d at 853 n.6. 
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1. During pertinent periods. Defendant contracted with at least two Utah corporations: 
(a) A June 1. 1996 contract with American Linen of Salt Lake Cit\. L'tah: (R. 
111-112) 
(b) August 19, 1996 with Retail Control Systems of Salt Lake City. Utah for 
maintenance of its "register equipment". (R. 113) 
2. The Defendant Nevada Corporation also leases, occupies and possesses the following 
parcels of real property in the state of Utah: 
(a) Property covered by an August 1, 1996 Lease by and between StateLine 
Properties, Inc. as landlord and Defendant as tenant covering certain property described in the 
document attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. 
(R. 114-118) 
(b) A duplex located in Wendover, Tooele County, Utah, covered by a Lease and 
extension thereof by and between StateLine Properties as lessor and Defendant as lessee. A copy 
of this Lease is attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion. (R. 119-120) 
(c) A Lease and extension thereof covering two warehouse buildings situated in 
Wendover, Tooele County, Utah, by and between StateLine Properties as lessor and Defendant, as 
lessee. A copy of said Lease is attached to Plaintiff/Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 121-122) 
(d) A Lease covering a parking structure and land by and between StateLine 
Properties, Inc., as lessor and StateLine Hotel, Inc. as lessee. A copy of said Lease is attached to 
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Plaintiff/Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 123-130) 
(e) A Lease co\ ering Lot 1. Block 26. Wendover Plat A in Tooele Count). Utah. 
by and between StateLine Properties, Inc.. as lessor and Defendant, as lessee. A cop\ of said Lease 
is attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 131-
137) 
(f) Building #406 at Decker Field in Wendover, Utah, under a D.F.A.A. Standard 
Lease wherein the city of Wendover appears as lessor and Defendant as lessee. A copy of said Lease 
is attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 138-
149) 
3. The insurance policy issued by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (policy number 
CK08305449) covering the slip and fall accident the subject of this litigation insures not only 
StateLine Hotel, Inc. (the Defendant), but also StateLine Properties, both the Utah Corporation and 
limited partnership. It also insures the StateLine Inn. a Utah Corporation. Property covered by the 
policy includes a hotel and motel in Utah; a mobile home park located in Utah; and the properties 
set forth in paragraph 2 above. Pertinent portions of the policy are attached to Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 150-159) 
4. Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories note not only the post office box located in 
Wendover, Utah, mentioned during oral argument at the original hearing, but two additional post 
office boxes in Utah. It also shows StateLine Properties, Inc. and StateLine Properties, Ltd.. Utah 
entities, shared that post office box. StateLine Hotel, Inc. also has a Utah cellular phone number, 
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regular phone number and six Utah fax numbers. See Defendant's Answer to Interrogator} No. 3, 
attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 160-162) 
5. Nearly even agreement entered into b\ Defendant, including the leases and contracts 
noted above, show they were executed and notarized in Salt Lake City, Utah. The documents were 
also drafted by Utah attorneys. 
DEFENDANT TRANSACTS SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS IN UTAH 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss premised upon the absence of personal jurisdiction argues 
it has only minimal contacts with Utah (arising out of advertising and promotional activities) which 
are insufficient for litigating unrelated causes of action. The foregoing facts indicate it does far 
more than simply advertise in Utah. Rather, it occupies no less than six pieces of property in the 
State; contracts with several Utah companies; and. interesting enough, is covered for the subject 
incident by an insurance policy also covering numerous Utah corporations and properties. All this 
is in addition to relevant facts such as maintaining Utah post office boxes, phone numbers and the 
substantial advertising it conducts in the State. 
Hence, it is almost ludicrous for Defendants to argue it does not have "substantial and 
continuous local activity" or that it does not expect to be hailed into Utah courts. (Please here note 
that the Answer to Interrogatory #4 discloses numerous other lawsuits pending against Defendant 
in the State of Utah). (See Exhibit "E") 
At least two recent Utah cases have, under circumstances similar to StateLine Hotel, found 
jurisdiction over non-resident corporations. For instance, in Radcliff v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608 
9 
(Utah 1994). the Court found that non-resident corporations are considered to be doing business in 
Utah "if the\ negotiate and enter into contracts within the state" something which Defendant has 
clearly done here. And, minimum contacts exists because Defendant could reasonabh anticipate 
being hailed into Court here. Bradford v Naegle. 763 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1988). Other factors 
relevant in our case include: (1) the presence of employees in the State; and (2) its' leasing or 
ownership of real or personal property in the State. See, Hebertson v Willow Creek Plaza. 895 P.2d 
839 (Utah 1995). 
Attempting to obscure its possession of propert} in Utah. Defendant's earlier filings, 
including specifically the affidavits of Larry Herron and Steven Brown Perry state that StateLine 
Hotel Inc. "does not own any property in Utah". They go on to state that StateLine Properties owns 
a one-half acre parcel of real property in Wendover, Utah. However, documents later produced 
indicate StateLine Properties owns at least five pieces of property in Utah all of which are leased to 
Defendant. Further, the} are insured under the same insurance policy disclosing ownership or 
possession of additional properties in Utah (at a minimum, the StateLine Inn). 
Further, a number of courts have held that advertising and promotional actrvities in a forum 
state were alone sufficient to invoke general personal jurisdiction. 
In Weintraub v. Walt Disnev World. 825 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Pa. 1993), Pennsylvania 
plaintiffs sued a corporation for injuries sustained on a ride at its amusement park and resort in 
Florida. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that 
defendant had "continuous and systematic" contacts with Pennsylvania. Id. at 721. Weintraub held 
it was proper to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the non-resident corporate defendant. 
Id at 722. 
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Similar to our facts, the defendant's contacts with the forum included: promoting itb 
amusement park and resort through newspapers and magazines circulated in Penns> hama: 
promoting its amusement park and resort on television programs and commercials aired in 
Pennsylvania; maintaining a toll-free 800 number for Penns\ lvania tra\el agents; and defendant's 
representatives visiting that state for public relations purposes. 
Boone v. Sulphur Creek Resort, Inc.. 749 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. Ind. 1990) involved an Indiana 
resident who brought suit in Indiana against a Kentucky corporation, headquartered in Kentucky, 
for injuries sustained at the corporation's resort located in Kentucky. Defendant sought to have 
plaintiffs action dismissed arguing the Indiana court lacked jurisdiction over it. The court held 
defendant's contacts with Indiana and its residents were '"continuous and systematic" sufficient for 
an Indiana court to exercise general personal jurisdiction. Id at 199. In reaching its decision, the 
court found that defendant's contacts with Indiana included advertising specifically targeted at 
Indiana residents, resulting in Indiana residents making up a large percentage of defendant's 
customer base (just as is the case with Utah residents and StateLine's Nevada resort). Furthermore, 
defendant sought to serve the Indiana tourist market; its representatives had made reservations for 
and taken deposits from Indiana residents while in Indiana; defendant had benefited from Indiana 
law and had solicited business there. Id. at 199-200. The court noted that the contacts between 
defendant and Indiana involved precisely those the United State Supreme Court has emphasized are 
significant. Id at 199: see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 
559, 62 L. Ed.2d 490 (1980). The court concluded defendant had '"purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state'" and could therefore '"reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court [in Indiana].'" Id at 200 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 297). 
1 1 
Additionalh. the Boone court recognized Indiana had a significant interest "in regulatii g the 
conduct of out-of-state actors who intentionally direct their advertising and promotional pleab to 
Indiana residents/* Id at 201. Because plaintiff resided in Indiana and received medical treatment 
in Indiana for injuries sustained at defendant's resort. Indiana was a reasonable location for plaintiff 
to bring his cause of action. IdL 
In Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Co.. 630 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1986), Pennsylvania 
residents brought an action in a Pennsylvania court against a Delaware corporation doing business 
in Florida for injuries sustained at the corporation's Florida complex. In determining whether 
Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over Disney, the court found it conducted extensive advertising in 
Pennsylvania for the purpose of promoting its entertainment complex in Florida. Specifically, 
defendant promoted its complex by advertising in a Philadelphia newspaper; providing a toll-free 
800 number for Pennsylvania residents to use to make reservations; and running a number of 
advertisements on local Philadelphia television stations. The court concluded that defendant's 
advertisements and related promotional activities reflected an ongoing pattern of activity in 
Pennsylvania which was substantial and continuous. Id at 152. Accordingly, the court held that 
general personal jurisdiction over defendant was - roper. Id 
Here, StateLine conducts extensive and aggressive advertising in Utah to promote its hotel 
and casino to Utah residents. StateLine's advertising includes advertisements that run regularly in 
local newspapers and magazines as well as frequently aired television and radio commercials on 
local Utah stations. StateLine also advertises through the use of billboards throughout Utah, as well 
as busing Utah residents to its casino. (R. 56, 59, 60, 61, 62) Coupled with its property interests 
12 
in Utah it seems these activities piovide ample leasons for this State to exeicise imisdiction o\ei 
a Nevada Corpoiation with its principal place of business in a boidei town 
Wendover, Ne\ada the town in which StateLine s hotel and casino is located is located on 
the Utah-Nevada border Salt Lake City and the Wasatch fiont in general is the closest aiea with a 
large concentration of population A large majority of StateLine s advertising and promotional 
activities are directed at Utah residents Consequent^, a majority of StateLine's pations are Utah 
residents 
StateLine maintains an office in Salt Lake City, Utah with StateLine Properties to direct its 
advertising campaign and booking reservations for Defendant StateLine's hotel and casino (R 56, 
59, 60, 61, 62) StateLine also provides a toll-free 800 number to Utah residents for making 
reservations at StateLine's hotel and casino (R 64) 
In sum, StateLme's advertising and promotion reflect an ongoing pattern of activity in Utah 
Its contacts with Utah are substantial continuous and s> stematic StateLine has purposefulh a\ ailed 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Utah and could therefore reasonabl) anticipate 
being haled into court in Utah Utah has a significant interest in regulating the conduct of StateLine 
an out-of-state actor who intentionally directs its advertising and promotional pleas to Utah residents 
This course of action, of contracting with Utah corporations, having ownership in Utah 
corporations and occupying at least six parcels of property, clearly demonstrates substantial contacts 
with this forum, and shows that these contacts are "continuous and systematic" It follows that as 
3
 Although this is not a "forum non conveniens" issue, the ease of obtaining 
witnesses' testimony (here far greater in Utah) should be a factor favoring jurisdiction in this 
forum 
13 
required by Abbott. Defendant/Appellee is "doing business" sufficient to confer jurisdiction, as 
Defendant Appellee has engaged in substantial and continuous acthfv in Utah. 
The Plaintiff made more than a prima facie showing that the trial court maintained pei^onal 
jurisdiction, and as evidenced above, its ruling to the contrary is clearh erroneous. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT UTAH'S LONG ARM STATUTE, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2^-24 (1996) DID NOT 
CONFER SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEE. 
A prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction was also made b\ Plaintiff/Appellant 
before the District Court. See Neways. Inc. v. McCauglan. supra. Specific personal jurisdiction 
applies to Utah's long-arm statute and requires only minimum contacts with the forum state. Where 
a defendant has only minimum contacts, specific personal jurisdiction may be asserted only on 
claims arising out of defendant's activity in the forum state. In Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan v. 
National Hotel Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (D. Utah 1987), the Court set forth a three step 
analysis for cases asserting specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute. First, it is 
necessary to determine whether the facts of the case meet one of the statute's specifically enumerated 
acts. Second, whether plaintiffs claim arises out of one of the statute's specifically enumerated acts. 
And finally, whether the jifrisdictional assertion meets federal due process requirements. Id. at 
1296-1298. 
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StateLine's conduct falls within one of Utah long-arm statute's speciticalh enumerated acts. 
Section 78-27-24 of the Utah Code provides in part: 
Am person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in 
person or through an agent does am of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state: . . . 
The long-arm statute "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. Clearly, the legislature intended 
to give broad application to the statute. Frontier. 675 F. Supp. at 1297 (quoting Synergetics v. 
Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (citing Brow-n v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d 
378, 380 (Utah 1980))). 
Section 78-27-23 of the Utah Code defines "transaction of business within this state" as 
"activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect persons 
or businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. 78-27-23(2). In light of the broad nature 
of the statute and the limited showing required of a plaintiff urging jurisdiction, Neways. supra; 
and Frontier. 675 F. Supp. at 1297 & n.5. Ms. Buddensick has made a prima facie showing that the 
Utah long-arm statute confers specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. By virtue of its 
substantial transaction of business in Utah (as set out more fully above in Point I), StateLine has 
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah. 
Plaintiffs claim also meets the second step in the jurisdictional analysis. Plaintiffs claim 
against StateLine for negligence arises out of StateLine's transaction of business in Utah in that she 
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traveled to Wendover and was a guest at StateLine'b hotel and casino due in part to StateLine's 
advertising and promotional acthities. 
In Alexander v. Circus Enters.. Inc.. 939 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1991). California residents 
brought a cause of action in California against a Ne\ada hotel and casino for injuries sustained on 
a pontoon boat associated with the resort. In deciding whether specific personal jurisdiction was 
proper over the Nevada defendant, the court first concluded defendant had substantial advertising 
directed at Southern California and that defendant had therefore purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Id. at 851-53. The court went on to determine 
whether plaintiffs claim arose out of defendant's forum related activity. Applying a "but for" test, 
the court concluded that plaintiffs claim did in fact arise out of defendant's advertising activities 
in California. Id. At 853. The court reasoned that defendant's solicitation of business in California 
attracted plaintiffs to the hotel and casino and subsequent pontoon boat ride. "It was the defendant's 
forum-related activities that put the parties within 'tortious striking distance* of one another.'* Id. 
(quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines. 897 F.2d 377, (9th Cir. 1990). The court held that specific 
personal jurisdiction over the Nevada defendant was proper in California. IcL At 854. 
The final and dispositive step in this analysis requires the assertion of jurisdiction to comply 
with federal due process limitations. In determining if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports 
with due process, "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully 
established 'minimum contacts' with the forum state." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 
462, 474 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In 
assessing minimum contacts, it is necessary to focus on the relationship of the defendant, the forum 
and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner. 435 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Moreover, it must be foreseeable 
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that the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [it] should 
reasonabh anticipate being haled into court""" in the forum state. Burger King. 471 U.S. at 474 
(quoting Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. \ . Woodson. 444 U.S. 286. 297 (1980)). because it has 
'"purposefully availfed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protection of its law.'"" Burger King. 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting Hanson v. 
Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
StateLine's conduct and connection with Utah is such that it has purposefully established 
minimum contacts with Utah to the extent it should reasonably anticipate being subject to 
jurisdiction in Utah. StateLine's connection to the forum is its transacting business in Utah. 
Specifically, StateLine conducts extensive and aggressive advertising in Utah directed at Utah 
residents, owns/leases property in Utah, contracts with at least three Utah corporations and has an 
ownership interest in a Utah corporation. It was this activity that resulted in plaintiffs injury and 
later precipitated this litigation. Alexander. 939 F.2d at 853 (citing Shute. 897 F.2d at 383-84) ("a 
tort can arise out of a prior business solicitation in the forum state''). And while the foreseeability 
of causing injury that will be felt in another state, is by itself not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, 
World-wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 294, StateLine has sufficient other contacts with Utah to 
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. 
StateLine's contacts with Utah have been discussed at length throughout this Brief. It is 
undoubtedly the magnitude of its property leasing, ownership interests, contracts with Utah 
residents, and StateLine's advertising and promotional activities in Utah that is significant. 
In analyzing StateLine's relation to the Utah forum, it cannot be overemphasized that 
StateLine is located in Wendover, a border-town that sits on the Utah-Nevada border. And that Salt 
17 
Lake Cit\ and the Wasatch fiont in geneial is the closest aiea with a laige concentiation ot 
population This fact alone makes this case unique in that a laige majonu ot Staiel ine s ad\ u using 
and promotional acti\ lties aie dnected at L tah lesidents Consequenth a ma]ont\ of StateLine s 
patrons are Utah residents 
StateLine deliberately created continuing obligations between itself and Utah b\ ti ansae ting 
business in Utah It is not inconsistent with due process foi this court to asseit junsdiction o\ei a 
party who created a continuing relationship and obligation with another state Burgei King 471 L S 
at 473 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n \ Virginia, 339 U S 643 647 (1950)) Because StateLine 
has "manifestly availed [itself] of the privilege of conducting business [in Utah], it is 
presumptively not unreasonable to require [it] to submit to the burdens of litigation in [Utah] as 
well " Burger King. 471 U S at 475-76 (citations omitted) Ha\mg profited from its mtei state 
activities in Utah it would be unfair to allow StateLine * to escape haung to account in [Utah] ioi 
consequences that arise proximately from such acti\ lties ' ld_ at 474 
Having established minimum contacts between StateLine and Utah, it is incumbent upon 
StateLine to * present a compelling case" that other factors make jurisdiction of thi^ court 
unreasonable Id_ at 477 StateLine avers that its burden of litigating in Utah is too great and that 
plaintiff could obtain relief from Nevada courts While StateLine s assertion alone falls short of 
w
 compelling," it is unfounded in that burden of plaintiff having to prosecute her case in Ne\ada is 
equall} as great or greater Utah has "manifest interest" in providing Plaintiff/Appellant with a 
convenient forum for redressing injuries resulting from StateLine's negligence See Id. at 473 
In conclusion, StateLine's activities meet Frontier s three step te^t for asserting specific 
personal jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has met the Neways' requirement of establishing a prima facie 
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showing that the long-arm statute applies. It is clear that Plaintiff Appellant's claim against 
StateLine for negligence arises out of one of the statute's specifically enumerated acts, namch . the 
transaction of business. Finalh. StateLine has purposefulh established minimum contacts with 
Utah, making this court' jurisdiction over it consistent with federal due process requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should properly reverse the trial court's erroneous rulings, and remand for trial 
because: 
1. Plaintiff/Appellant has made a prima facie showing that general personal jurisdiction 
exists over Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant has demonstrated that Defendant /Appellee has 
substantial contacts with this forum that are continuous and systematic, and that Defendant/Appellee 
has engaged in substantial and continuous local activity, which is sufficient to reach the requirement 
of "doing business" within the State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff/Appellant has made a prima facie showing that specific personal jurisdiction 
exists over Defendant/Appellee. Defendant/Appellee is transacting business within this State, 
Plaintiff/Appellant's claim arises out of the transacting of business in Utah and 
Defendant/Appellee's business activities are such that they have purposely availed themselves to the 
jurisdiction of Utah courts satisfying federal due process requirements. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lb da% of June. 1998. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Michael'XTKatz 
Deven J. Coggins 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
this * J da\ of June. 1 * The undersigned hereby certifies that on     . 998. two copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully prepaid, to: 
Cynthia Meyer 
Stephen G. Morgan 
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE 
Kearns Building 
136 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^lOii&rk/j, 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts sub-
mitting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether 
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal represen-
tative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate mainte-
nance, or child support, having resided, in the marital 
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subse-
quent departure from the state; or the commission in this 
state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act 
is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over 
which the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this 
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of 
establishing responsibility for child support. 1992 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
EXHIBIT "C" 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7888 
Fax number: (801) 531-9732 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS BUDDENSICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATELINE CASINO, INC., dba 
STATELINE HOTEL AND CASINO, 
and DOES I-X, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 9709003891PI 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Based on Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction was initially argued before die Court on June 30, 1997. Cynthia K.C. Meyer of 
Morgan & Hansen appeared for the Defendant, State Line Hotel, Inc., and Michael A. Katz of 
Siegfried & Jensen appeared for the Plaintiff, Chris Buddensick. After argument, the Court set 
the matter for an evidentiary hearing and allowed Plaintiff to engage in discovery. The Court's 
ruling in that regard was made on the record on June 30, 1997. 
The matter was again heard on September 15, 1997, the date set for evidentiary hearing. 
Ms. Meyer again appeared for the Defendant and Mr. Katz again appeared for Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
did not present evidence, but had engaged in discovery during the interim between the two 
hearings. 
The Court, having read and considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the 
parties, including the supplemental memoranda containing discovery responses submitted by the 
parties prior to the September 15, 1997, hearing, having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, being familiar with and having reviewed the file, being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause otherwise appearing, now makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant, the State Line Hotel. Inc., is a Nevada corporation which owns and 
operates the State Line Hotel and Casino in Wendover, Nevada. 
2. On July 29, 1995, Plaintiff slipped and fell on the premises of the State Line 
Hotel and Casino while going through a food buffet line. 
3. Defendant advertises its Nevada hotel and casino in Utah. 
T \WP51\BUDDENS\FINDFACT WPD 2 
4. Defendant contracts for goods and services from entities in several states 
including Utah and Nevada. 
5. Defendant owns stock in a Utah corporation, State Line Properties, Inc., which 
is the general partner of a Utah limited partnership, State Line Properties, Ltd. State Line 
Properties, Inc., and State Line Properties, Ltd., along with several other entities, are named 
insureds under the same insurance policy as Defendant. 
6. State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line Properties, Ltd. own five parcels of 
real property in Wendover, Utah, which they lease to Defendant. Two of the parcels are used 
for parking lot, parking structure, and signage purposes relating to Defendant's hotel and 
casino business. The city of Wendover leases a storage unit at Decker Field to Defendant. 
7. Defendant's leasing of incidental parcels including signage and parking areas 
while directly related to the carrying-on of its business in Nevada is not an integral part of the 
business in the sense that the hotel and casino could not continue without it. 
8. Defendant does not own any real property in Utah. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs slip and fall and her subsequent cause of action against Defendant did 
not arise out of Defendant's contacts with the state of Utah; therefore, Utah's Long-Arm 
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 does not apply. 
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2. Defendant does not do business in Utah by virtue of its ownership of stock in 
State Line Properties, Inc., a Utah Corporation, which does business in Utah. In addition, 
Defendant does not do business in Utah by virtue of the commonality of stock holders and 
partners among Defendant, State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line Properties, Ltd. 
3. The fact that Defendant, State Line Properties, Inc., and State Line Properties, 
Ltd., are insured under the same insurance policy is irrelevant. 
4. Defendant's advertising and promotional activities in Utah are insufficient to 
confer general personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Utah courts. 
5. The Defendant's leasing of the parcels of real property in Wendover, Utah, is 
insufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Utah courts. 
6. Overall, Defendant's contacts with Utah are limited in nature (although some 
are continuous) and are not tantamount to doing business in Utah, such that the exercise of 
general personal jurisdiction over Defendant would be appropriate. 
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court hereby 
ORDERS that Plaintiffs Complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice 
on the grounds that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant, either 
general or specific. 
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DATED this ^ day of 3€£te&ber, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
( 
Michael A. Katz 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
William A. Tnorne 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the }i) day of JifitZmfai- . 1997, pursuant to 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Jud. Admin., I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER to be served on 
the following for approval as to form via first class mail, postage pre-paid: 
Michael A. Katz 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
"l\}kuuc Tiler-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT o P ^ P ^ ^ S s ^ ^ y S F l T Y 
Triira Judicial uistnct 
STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
CHRIS BUDDENSICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE LINE HOTEL, INC., dba 
STATE LINE HOTEL AND 
CASINO, and DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
FEB 1 1 1998 
By S , Ovy^ 
Deputy CJerx 
Case No. 970900389 PI 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of June, 
1997, commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
FILED 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f : 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
: MICHAEL A. KATZ 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
FEB 1 2 1938 
For the Defendants: 
S l i S S K d * SnseS?«JRT OF APPEALS 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER 
Attorney at Law 
Morgan & Hansen 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
D U P L I C A T E 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
maSMA 3-Ma 
State 
or— 
we'll 
State 
Line 
P R O 
Casino. 
go ahead 
This 
Line 
appearance
 t 
and 
THE 
Are 
MR. 
THE 
C E E D I N G S 
COURT: The Buddensick versus 
we ready to go 
KATZ: Yes, we 
COURT: Okay. 
get that started. 
is Case ] 
Casino, 
, if you 
Inc. 
forward with that, 
are, your Honor. 
Come on up and 
Mo. 970900389, Buddensick versus 
I'll ask each of you to make an 
would, so the record is complete. 
MR. KATZ: Michael A. Katz, appearing 
on behalf of the plaintiff, your Honor. 
MS. MEYER: Cindy Meyer on behalf of 
the defendant. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Meyer, this is 
your motion. 
MS. MEYER: Thank you, your Honor. 
Your Honor, plaintiff had a slip and fall 
accident in the State Line Hotel in Wendover, Nevada. 
THE COURT: That would be in the 
restaurant portion? 
MS. MEYER: In the restaurant portion 
of the hotel. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
2 
1 MS. MEYER: She was in the food 
2 buffet line. 
3 That occurred in July of 1995. There's some 
4 reference to 1996, but it really was '95. 
g She filed her lawsuit early this year and State 
g Line Hotel, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
j jurisdiction, and specifically, lack of personal 
g jurisdiction over the State Line. 
g Now, plaintiff—we filed the motion in mid-
March, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition in 
mid-May, pursuant to agreements to extend the time, we've 
been very lenient with each other that way. We filed our 
reply memorandum and then last Friday, the plaintiff sent 
to the Court under a cover letter, a couple of orders 
from a case that was— 
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16 I THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
17 MS. MEYER: In the Patton case in the 
United States District Court. 
You know, the cases are unrelated, other than 
the fact that there were injuries on the premises. Those 
are the only operative facts that are similar. 
That the orders are—are not—they don't have 
precedential value, they weren't published, they don't 
contain the reasoning and procedurally, it seems like, 
you know, it's a pretty unfair procedure. There was the 
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1 two months to file a memorandum in opposition and to 
2 include whatever the—or whatever the plaintiff wanted to 
3 include in the opposition papers and that wasn't done, 
4 and that was the reason we filed a motion to strike on 
5 Friday as well, 
g Let me turn to the motion to dismiss, however, 
j your Honor. And first, I'd like to address the specific 
g personal jurisdiction. That arises under Utah's long-arm 
g statute, which is found in Section 78-27-24. 
1Q And what it states is that a person, whether or 
1<l not a resident of Utah, submits himself to the 
2^ jurisdiction of Utah's courts for any causes of action 
13 arising out of, among other things, the transaction of 
14 business in Utah or the causing of an injury in Utah. 
15 Now, plaintiff claims that her—her claim arose 
-I0 from State Line's transacting business in Utah because it 
17 
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advertises here. She does not claim that it arises under 
the injury sub-part of the paragraph, which is the 
causing of an injury here, because her injury—her injury 
wasn't caused here. Her injury was caused in Nevada. 
Now, her injury does not arise from and was not 
caused by advertising, your Honor. If you look at her 
complaint, she says the State Line failed to maintain its 
premises in a reasonably safe manner. That's negligence. 
That's what caused her injuries. It didn't arise out of 
i o 
1 any advertising. 
2 The plaintiff does rely on a couple of Ninth 
3 Circuit Court of Appeals cases, but neither of those 
4 cases are—are good law, any longer. The first case was 
5 the Alexander vs. Circus Circus case, and that was a case 
in which the Ninth Circuit said that but for the 
7 I defendant's advertising in the forum, plaintiff would not 
Q have gone out of state and become injured. 
g A petition for re-hearing was filed by the 
defendant, however. The petition for re-hearing was 
granted, the Ninth Circuit withdrew that opinion that I 
just mentioned, that the plaintiff relies on and then 
quashed service of process and dismissed the complaint 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. So, that case—I 
mean, you just can't rely on it at all. 
The other case was Shute—S-h-u-t-e—vs. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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17 I Carnival Cruise Lines. The Ninth Circuit said the same 
thing, but for Carnival Cruise Line's promotion in the 
State of Washington, Shute would not have gone on the 
cruise and become injured in a slip and fall on the—on 
the cruise deck in international waters. 
That case eventually went to the United States 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court reversed. Now, it 
reversed for slightly different reasons. There had been-
-there was a clause in the contract which said that all 
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litigation would be filed in—in Florida. The Ninth 
Circuit had said that clause is unenforceable and, but 
for the promotion, he wouldn't have been injured. 
The Supreme Court said the clause is 
enforceable so, you know, it gets kicked out and—and 
needs to be tried in Florida. 
There are many courts that do not rely on this 
"but for11 analysis and—and the reasoning is—is very 
understandable• There is no cause and effect 
relationship between the advertising or the promotion and 
the injury itself. It's just too attenuated to make some 
kind of connection. 
And one case that's directly on point is a case 
that we cited in our reply memorandum, perhaps in our 
memorandum in support as well, called Munlev vs. Second 
District Court. That was a case filed by a Nevada 
resident, Munley, who went to the California side of Lake 
Tahoe to ski and he was injured. I think he fell off the 
chair lift or something like that. And he claimed that 
there was specific personal jurisdiction due to the ski 
resort's advertising in Nevada. 
Now, the ski resort—the Court said all the ski 
resort did was promotional activities in Nevada; but it 
was a member of the Reno-Sparks Chamber of Commerce, it 
sent travel brochures, it advertised in newspapers and so 
i/l 
1 forth. It did, really, quite a bit of advertising. 
2 And the Court said, that's not what—even if 
3 that is transacting business, even if we accept that, 
4 that's not what the injuries arose from. And even if the 
5 plaintiff responded directly to those promotional 
g activities in going to Nevada, that's still not what 
j caused these injuries. 
g Look at the complaint. What caused his 
g injuries is the alleged failure to maintain the chair 
«IQ lift. Same in our case. What caused the injuries is the 
-J-J I alleged failure to maintain the floor around the buffet 
«I2 food line and not any advertising. 
-13 | So, the plaintiff in this case can only 
.J4 I establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant under 
«I5 the general jurisdiction notion, not under the long-arm 
<lg i statute. 
]j I Now, under the general jurisdiction notion, a 
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court—and—and let me just interrupt myself. This law 
is developed primarily through United States Supreme 
Court decisions, State Supreme Court decisions, this is 
case law rather than statutory law, most of the time. 
And a court can have general personal 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for any claim 
if the defendant's activities in the State are so 
substantial and continuous that the traditional notions 
1 of fair play and justice are not: violated by bringing 
2 that defendant into the out-of-state courts in order to 
3 litigate those claims. 
4 Now, in Mallory Engineering vs. Ted R, Brown & 
5 Associates. a Utah Supreme Court case, the Utah Supreme 
5 Court contrasted the general personal jurisdiction to 
7 specific personal jurisdiction and commented on specific 
3 personal jurisdiction by saying that if the activities of 
g the defendant are limited in nature or transitory in 
1Q duration, then the courts can only assume personal 
H J jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. 
12 I And that's what we have here. We have 
13 I advertising that's limited in nature. It's also 
14 
18 
19 
transitory in duration. The State Line operates its 
15 J hotel and casino in Nevada, not here in—in Utah. What 
-|Q it does in Utah is promote the hotel and casino business. 
17 The Utah appellate courts have not specifically 
addressed these issues, but there are many other cases 
that have directly addressed the advertising issues and 
2Q I whether that's enough to confer general personal 
2-| jurisdiction. 
And one of the most notable cases is a case 
that's very similar to this case, which is called State 
(inaudible^ Circus Circus vs. Pope. It involved an 
Oregon resident, Pope, who went to Circus Circus in Reno, 
22 
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24 
25 
8 
9 
10 
11 
-I I believe, and was injured when a drunken guest pitched a 
2 beer bottle out of a hotel window and—and cracked him in 
3 the head or something like that. 
4 Pope then sued Circus Circus in Oregon and 
c claimed that there was jurisdiction. With respect to 
g general jurisdiction, Pope made the same argument that 
j the plaintiff makes in this case, that the hotel and 
« casino's activities in Oregon were substantial because it 
advertised and it maintained a toll-free 800 number. 
But the Oregon Supreme Court rejected that 
argument and said, we're unpersuaded that that's any kind 
12 of substantial activity. 
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Another case, not involving hotels and casinos, 
but similar in reasoning is the case called Conaoleum 
Corp. vs. D.L.W. Acting Gasell Shoft (?), which is a 
Ninth Circuit case from 1984. And in that case, the 
17 foreign defendant's in-state activities consisted of 
sales and marketing efforts through a California company 
is hired to do the sales and marketing. 
And I jotted down what it did. The—the 
California company, which was not the same as—as the 
foreign company, solicited orders, it recommended other 
sales agents, ordered samples, promoted the D.L.W. 
products through mail and show room display and attended 
trade shows and sales meetings. 
1 And the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
2 maintenance of even a substantial sales force is not 
3 sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated 
4 cause of action. And that's what we have here in this 
5 case—well, we don't have a substantial sales force, but 
g again, we have—we have promotion* 
Plaintiff mentioned in the memorandum in 
g I opposition the—the sales office in Salt Lake City. That 
g sales office is operated by a Utah company called State 
10 Line Properties, Limited, and it takes reservations for 
11 hotel rooms, golf packages, gaming tournaments, shows and 
12 so forth, but it's not the State Line Hotel here doing 
.j3 business, it's a Utah company, a limited partnership, the 
general partner of which is a Utah corporation. 
We've cited several other cases. We certainly 
don't need to go into all of those, but suffice it to say 
14 
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17 that in case after case after case, where what we're 
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talking about is advertising and promotion, the courts 
have said— 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, Counsel. Let 
me back up just to a point that you mentioned a moment 
ago. Isn't the Nevada corporation a general or the 
majority shareholder of the Utah corporation? 
MS. MEYER: I don't believe so. I 
think it has been, in the past; but even if it were, 
10 
10 
1 what—well, what plaintiff mentioned in the—in the 
2 memorandum in opposition is that the shareholders—there 
3 are common shareholders, I believe. 
4 But even—even so, that doesn't, unless we're 
5 trying to break down corporate formalities and there have 
g been no claims of alter ego or piercing the corporate 
j veil or anything like that, then we still don't get to 
g jurisdiction because there's a—a related company that 
g the—that's actually a Utah corporation; in fact, there's 
substantial case law and we cited a case in our reply 
^ memorandum concerning bringing in parent corporations 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
when there's a subsidiary that is a resident of the 
state• 
Quite often, you know, you have a parent 
corporation that owns all of the stock in a subsidiary, 
but they're—they're domiciled in different states. And 
17 time after time, the courts have rejected any notion that 
because of that ownership alone, you can bring that 
parent corporation in. You've got to be able to show 
either the specific jurisdiction because of acts arising 
in the forum, or the general jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff relies on a couple of cases from the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the proposition that 
advertising is enough to establish general jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state company. 
11 
10 
1 Those cases both involve Walt Disney World, and 
2 as I mentioned, they're both arising out of the Eastern 
3 District of Pennsylvania. 
4 The first case is called Weintrol vs. Walt 
5 Disney World. And it recognized a line of cases 
6 involving Walt Disney and apparently arising in 
7 Pennsylvania in which the courts said that there was not 
8 jurisdiction because the advertising alone was 
g insufficient to confer that general jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: Wasn't there 
-11 I transportation involved in that (Inaudible) 
-j2 MS. MEYER: Well, yeah, in that case 
-I3 and—and the Court distinguished those other cases and 
14 said there's a lot more going on than just advertising. 
15 We have Disney people, you know, conducting a seminar in 
1g Pittsburgh, they're coming in for college relations, I 
17 think they were recruiting college students to go down 
1Q and work. They sent representatives for professional 
staffing purposes and sent the publicity staff to 
Pennsylvania and for all of those combined reasons, the 
court said that—that's pretty intentional—well, 
intentional isn't the word, but it—it's substantial 
conduct and that's enough to confer general jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: It's the corporation 
choosing to do business— 
19 
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1 MS. MEYER: That's right. 
2 THE COURT: —in Pennsylvania. 
3 MS. MEYER: That's right. Actually 
4 going to Pennsylvania and conducting business, rather 
5 than just promoting a theme park in Florida, 
g Same thing in the Gavigan case, versus Walt 
7 Disney World. There was—there was similar purposeful— 
g that was the word I was looking for—conduct in 
g Pennsylvania beyond mere advertising that caused that 
1Q court to say again, we—we have personal jurisdiction 
^ over this company, 
And here in the state—in this case, the only 
evidence that we have is that the State Line advertises. 
14 I Plaintiff hasn't submitted any evidence concerning the 
15 amount of advertising or the extent of advertising, other 
1g | than to use strong adjectives in—in the memoranda. 
17 And even under these authorities relied on by 
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the plaintiff, again, merely advertising is not enough to 
confer general jurisdiction. 
Your Honor, I have some of the main cases we 
relied on, if it would be helpful to the Court, I'd like 
to hand that up. Would that be all right? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MEYER: And let me just for the 
record indicate that the cases I've handed up to the 
13 
1 Court are the Circus Circus vs. Pope, the Conaoleum vs. 
2 the D.L.W., and the long German name, Price and Sons vs. 
3 the Second District Court and the Munley vs. the Second 
4 District Court. 
5 Your Honor, the relief we're asking for is that 
g the Court dismiss the complaint for lack of personal 
7 jurisdiction and strike plaintiff's submission to the 
3 Court of last Friday, 
g Thank you, 
THE COURT: Mr. Katz? 
-j-j I MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 Initially, permit me to address, please, the 
13 allegations and the arguments made concerning the motion 
to strike. 
The orders that we submitted from Judge Sam, I 
did not submit those claiming that they are binding 
10 
14 
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17 precedent on this Court. They are, however, indicative 
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of Judge Sam's ruling in an identical motion to dismiss. 
In that case, they also had a motion for change of venue 
because it was in the Federal Court and could have 
transferred over to Nevada; the fact is, Judge Sam denied 
those motions and the memorandums of the parties were 
almost identical, the issues raised were almost identical 
and Judge Sam ruled against defendant in that case. That 
was the purpose of my showing them to you and submitting 
14 
1 them for your review. 
2 The question raised by the motion is whether or 
3 not we have met the standards needed for either specific 
4 or general jurisdiction over the defendant. Under the 
5 general jurisdiction provisions, the question becomes 
6 whether or not the defendant conducts substantial and 
7 continuous local activity. 
3 And as the memoranda reflect, we believe that 
g probably the strongest evidence of substantial and 
10 continuous local activity is defendant's advertising 
11 activities within the State; however, in contrary to the 
12 cases that the defendant primarily relies upon, which by 
13 the way, are mixed, as the memoranda indicate. Some 
14 courts have held that advertising alone is sufficient. 
15 Nothing else. 
1g The cases are mixed. We've cited a bunch, 
17 they've cited a bunch. I think they're—I think our 
cases are, frankly, more persuasive, but we think we've 
got a lot more facts to rely upon to show continuous and 
local activity. And I'd like to go over those with the 
Court— 
18 
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22 THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. KATZ: —if I might, because I 
think that is the central inquiry raised by the motion, 
Number one, we do have common ownership and 
15 
1 management of the two entities- One, a Utah corporation, 
2 State Line Properties, and State Line Hotel, the Nevada 
3 corporation. 
4 In fact, their memoranda states that State Line 
5 Hotel is the sole owner of State Line Properties. That 
5 is in the affidavit of Larry Herrin, which we attached as 
7 an exhibit to the memorandum. 
g It states that they own the stock, period. 
g Over and out. It's a wholly-owned subsidiary. And while 
10 we admit that owning a subsidiary, by itself, is not 
H adequate, it does reflect continuous and substantial 
12 local activity. Not just advertising. Wholly-owned 
13 | subsidiary is a Utah corporation. That Utah corporation 
14 I owns property in the State of Utah. 
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Mr. Herrin's affidavit, which is attached as 
Exhibit B, also indicates there's common stockholders 
17 among the corporation and common management. 
Mr. Jim Smith, Mr. Herrin, himself, who 
submitted the affidavit in the Federal Court case. 
There's a lot more here than just advertising activities, 
which your Honor is probably familiar with if you—if you 
drive the freeways around Salt Lake. You've seen the 
billboards, you've seen the ads in the newspapers. 
But we believe there's even more, your Honor. 
If I might approach and I've provided Ms. Meyer with 
16 
copies, these are some other submittals that were in 
evidence before Judge Sam. 
What I've handed you, your Honor, is the 
accident report that was submitted in the Patton case. 
You'll note it says State Line Hotel Casino and 
Convention Center. Wendover, Utah, your Honor, is the 
address. 
I would also like to submit— 
THE COURT: Well, it's a post office 
box. 
MR. KATZ: Yes. But it shows 
activities, continuous activities within the State of 
Utah. They maintain their post office box here, your 
Honor. 
I would also like to hand you a supplemental 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) that was sent 
in by the defendant. It states as one of their witnesses 
in the Patton case, State Line Hotel, Wendover, Utah. 
Once again, they're claiming that they're located in 
Wendover, Utah. 
And if I might also submit defendant's Rule 
26(a) disclosures in the Federal Court case. And these 
are additional accident reports, your Honor, that were 
submitted in connection with Patton. 
And what I'd like you to note on these, if you 
17 
7 
1 would, please, is the fax, information contained at the 
2 top of the statements. State Line Hotel, Fax No. 
3 801-532-4090. That's a Utah area code, your Honor, for 
4 the State Line Hotel. Not State Line Properties, the 
5 Utah corporation, State Line Hotel. 
5 So, we're not just saying they advertise, your 
7 Honor, although they do substantial and continuous and 
3 costly, undoubtedly costly advertising; they have most of 
g their employees residents of the State of Nevada. That's 
ig also indicated in the 26(a) disclosures. They list three 
11 or four witnesses, all of them are employees who have 
12 Utah residences. 
13 They maintain post office boxes in the State of 
14 Utah. They have wholly-owned subsidiaries in the State 
15 of Utah. They have common shareholders with Utah 
1g corporations and we believe those shareholders are 
17 residents of the State of Utah. 
13 And they maintain telephone numbers and fax 
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machines in the State of Utah, which I think very clearly 
raises an inference that they maintain offices in the 
State of Utah. They can't have it both ways. 
I'd like to point out just a couple other 
things, your Honor, that I don't believe were addressed 
very much in the memorandum. We believe there are the 
substantial and continuous local activities which support 
18 
-j the Court's exercise of jurisdiction, and I think perhaps 
2 to preface this comment, I should note that the long-arm 
3 statute is to be construed as broadly as possible, so as 
4 to confer jurisdiction over non-residents. So, we've got 
5 that policy. 
5 And we also have the court stating, and I'm 
7 specifically referring to the very recent case of 
8 Anderson vs. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, an 
g expansive grant of jurisdictional power is conferred upon 
-JO the Courts of this case (sic) over non-residents. 
H j So, we think the general policy is that, 
12 | plaintiffs get the benefit of the doubt in cases like 
13 I this. But as the submittals of the parties recognize, 
14 there's affidavits, there's—there's exhibits. T h e r e — w e 
15 I believe there should be depositions. We believe that if 
1g they're going to claim that they don't do anything in the 
17 State, we are entitled to conduct discovery on that issue 
and perhaps this motion is presently premature, 
ig I And once again, we rely upon, to support that 
20 principle, the recent case of Anderson vs. American 
Society of Plastic Surgeons, the citation on that is 807 
P.2d 825. That case stands for the proposition that this 
is a fact-laden inquiry. If there are disputes and once 
again, the benefit of the doubt is given the plaintiff as 
it would be, for instance, on a — o n a summary judgment 
21 
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23 
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19 
1 motion. The facts are construed in our favor; but 
2 J nonetheless, if the defendant can raise some evidence 
that general jurisdiction should not be exercised, this 
4 I is the kind of thing that should be resolved at trial. 
5 You try the jurisdictional facts at the time you try the 
5 underlying facts. 
7 Or another option that the American Society of 
3 Plastic Surgeons case gives your Honor is, since there 
g are disputes, since it is an intricate issue, competing 
-(0 claims, competing allegations, your Honor should perhaps 
-(-I conduct an evidentiary hearing and that's another option 
-12 that the District Court is given by the Supreme Court in 
-j3 the plastic surgeons case. 
-14 We think—you don't have to do that, your 
-I5 Honor. We think we've given you a number of documents 
-jg that reflect the fact that State Line Hotel expects to be 
jj hailed into the courts of this State; they have Utah 
-jg subsidiaries, they have Utah officers, they have Utah 
-•g shareholders, they conduct substantial activities beyond 
advertising, we're not just relying on advertising, we're 
relying on a whole series of interactions with Utah 
residents, with Utah courts, with Utah business, they 
contract for services here. They contract for food, they 
buy food in the State of Utah. 
And unlike all of the cases that either side 
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1 cites, it's significant to note that this is a border 
2 town. Most of Wendover, at least, I believe most of the 
3 residences in Wendover, actually lie on the Utah side of 
4 the—of the border. It—it's kind of an artificial 
5 distinction, I guess is what I'm saying, 
5 In closing, your Honor, I would like to point 
7 out one other fact that does weigh in our favor, and that 
3 is the convenience of the parties. If their officers, 
g managers, employees are residents of Utah, it's far more 
10 convenient for both sides, not just the plaintiffs, but 
H both sides, to litigate this case in the State of Utah. 
12 For instance, the plaintiff's treating 
13 physicians, who will undoubtedly have to be deposed, are 
14 all Salt Lake residents. The plaintiff resides here. It 
15 would be far more convenient for both sides, to litigate 
1g this case in Utah and convenience is a very important 
17 factor that the Court recognizes in the Mai lory vs. Ted 
13 Brown case, which the defense already directed your 
attention to. 
State Line Hotel, albeit a Nevada corporation, 
has substantial contacts with Utah. They do conduct 
continuous local activities here. They should expect to 
be hailed into the Utah courts for suit. 
We believe the motion to dismiss should be 
denied. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
21 
1 THE COURT: Ms- Meyer? 
2 MS. MEYER: Thanks, your Honor. 
3 Now, with regard to motion to strike, if Judge 
4 Sam's orders aren't precedents and they're merely 
5 interesting and shouldn't have been submitted. 
5 And I'd like to clarify something. There is 
y not one case in either memoranda that was submitted to 
g the Court in which any court held that mere advertising 
g is enough to confer general jurisdiction. Even in "the 
10 Boone vs. Sulphur Creek case cited by the plaintiff, the 
11 court found that there was other purposeful conduct 
12 besides advertising on the part of the owner of the 
13 resort in going to Indiana, that went beyond advertising. 
14 Your Honor, these submissions—I mean, you 
15 know, this is another reason that we have rules with 
1g respect to filing a motion and filing a memorandum and 
17 having the reply time. If these had been attached to the 
memorandums, if they'd been argued in the memorandums, I 
could have responded to them in the reply. As it is, 
what I need to do is—is make some kind of a proffer and-
-and hope that that's sufficient. 
In another case that we have, one of the things 
we learned about the P.O. boxes is that, at least as of a 
couple of years ago, I don't know if it's still the case 
now; there was not a post office on the Nevada side of 
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the town of Wendover, and there was not door-to-door mail 
delivery. So, if anyone wanted to receive mail, they had 
to have a post office box in the Wendover, Utah post 
office. That's just the way it worked in Wendover. That 
isn't substantial contact with the State, that's just the 
way it was in that small town. 
It's kind of like Park City. A lot of people 
know that if you want a good mail delivery—and I 
understand this is changing lately—that you need to get 
a post office box. And—and as I said, in Wendover, they 
didn't even have the door-to-door mail delivery, so they 
had to have a post office box. That's not a physical 
address. 
There is no question and there's no dispute 
that the entirety of the State Line Hotel and Casino 
premises are located on the Nevada side. I don't know— 
you know, I don't have an answer to the Fax number other 
than, you know, perhaps it came from—actually came from 
the State Line Properties office; but if you look at the 
State Line letterhead, where it has the post office box 
in Utah, it has the 702 number. 
If you call out there and when I've called out 
there, when I call my client, I call Nevada, I call 702 
and—and whatever the phone number is. 
Same with the employees who were going to 
23 
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1 testify in the Patton case. The addresses, you know, we 
2 have to give addresses under the Rule 26(a)(1) 
3 disclosures in Federal Court, their addresses are the 
4 post office boxes because that's the only way they can be 
5 reached. There are street addresses apparently, but if 
g you want to mail something to them, that's—that's the 
j way they need to be reached. 
g I think that was—those were really the only 
g issues that were raised. Oh, no. On the supplemental 
disclosure under Rule 26, it says Rule 26(e) in the 
Patton case, we make reference to Steve LeMaster, State 
Line Hotel, Wendover, Utah. 
That's a typographical error, for one of two 
reasons, and I don't remember where LeMaster was at the 
time. If he were at the State Line Hotel that we're 
dealing with in this case, that's in Nevada, and so the 
-jy Utah's a typographical error. 
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There is, however, a hotel on the Utah side 
called the State Line Inn. Now, if that's the case, that 
would be Utah, but then State Line Hotel would be wrong, 
it should have said State Line Inn; but again, there's no 
question. Physically, State Line Hotel and Casino is in 
Nevada. Physically, plaintiff's injury occurred in 
Nevada, not in Utah. 
The plaintiff makes some argument that—that 
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1 this motion may be premature under—under Rule 12(b). We 
2 certainly have the right to file an immediate motion to 
3 dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
4 Plaintiff did not come into Court and seek to 
5 do any discovery and could have done so on this issue. 
g Plaintiff has the burden of proof, not the defense, once 
7 the jurisdiction is contested• 
8 It—it, I think would be improper to proceed 
g with an evidentiary hearing here today and I—I donrt 
think the plaintiff is really proposing that we do so; 
but again, bringing in all of this additional evidence 
and not following the procedures really is unfair. 
The fact that Wendover is a border town isn't 
significant. There are lots of border towns. And the 
significance of state lines and whether we respect state 
lines for jurisdictional purposes, and the Utah Supreme 
17 Court in Worldwide Volkswagen says, we don't ignore state 
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lines, we cannot do that under a jurisdictional analysis. 
So, you know, the fact that—that there are 
residents on both sides of the—of the line is really 
insignificant. The—the injury occurred in Nevada and 
the question is, do we bring this Nevada corporation in 
to Utah? 
Again, the fact that there are common 
shareholders of the—the Utah and the Nevada entities is 
25 
-I really insignificant. In order to break down those 
2 corporate barriers, the plaintiff has to get in, under 
3 some kind of an alter ego or pierce the corporate veil 
4 argument, hasn't made an kind of an argument along that 
5 line, so common ownership is completely irrelevant and 
g immaterial. 
j And finally, your Honor, this is not a foreign 
Q non-convenience argument or case. This is a jurisdiction 
g case. Granted, there would be some inconvenience to 
plaintiff in going to Elko to try this case. Certainly, 
there's some inconvenience to the State Line people, 
10 
11 
-I2 including any employees who work out there who would be 
13 
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witnesses in coming to Salt Lake to try this case. 
But again, it's not a foreign non-convenience 
issue, it's a jurisdiction issue and the jurisdictional 
principles have to take precedence over the convenience 
17 J of the parties. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. 
Let me state for the record that if it were 
simply a question of wholly-owned subsidiary or common 
shareholders or officers who live in Utah or employees 
who live in Utah, that would not be enough to convey 
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I'm going to rule as well that advertising 
alone is also insufficient to convey jurisdiction to this 
26 
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-I | Court, 
2 i I am concerned, though, I think if post office 
3 box is in Utah and there are options otherwise available, 
4 telephone lines, faxes, if they were doing business in 
5 Utah, that would be sufficient to give this Court 
g jurisdiction. Because there appears to be some 
7 significant factual questions around those issues, I am 
Q going to set it for an evidentiary hearing on the 
9 question of whether the State Line Casino does in fact do 
business within the State of Utah, take advantage of 
doing business within the State of Utah, but that would 
have to exceed advertising, having owners in common, 
-I3 having employees or managers who live in the State, 
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that's—that's clearly not sufficient, 
15 Jolene, can you hand me the scheduling book? 
How soon, Counsel, are you going to be ready to 
d o — 
MR. KATZ: Well— 
THE COURT: — a short hearing on that 
question? 
MR. KATZ: I—I think the hearing 
should be short; however, I do think we should be 
entitled to limited discovery on that issue. I mean, at 
p 4 least a deposition of the manager and perhaps, you know, 
some sort of 30(b)(6) designated representative of the 
27 
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-I hotel- I think—I think that's the bare minimum. 
2 THE COURT: How long do you think you 
3 need to do that? Thirty days? Sixty days? 
4 MR. KATZ: I was going to say 45 
5 days, so, split the difference between 30 and 60, 
Q THE COURT: Is that agreeable, Ms, 
7 Meyer? 
8 I MS. MEYER: Sure. 
9 I THE COURT: Okay. We'll look to set 
10 
11 
12 
this hearing with the understanding that limited 
discovery on the question of doing business within the 
State of Utah not related to advertising or common 
-jg I stockholders, but simply the question of whether they 
14 exercise the privilege of doing business within the 
State, discovery on that will cut off in 45 days. 
That will put us to August 18th, the discovery 
15 
16 
17 cut-off. And hear this some time after, beginning of 
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September; is that agreeable? 
How long do you think you need? A half an 
hour? 
MR. KATZ: Oh, I think an hour. 
MS. MEYER: I— 
MR. KATZ: They7re going to put a 
witness on, I'm sure. 
MS. MEYER: Well, you can put a 
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witness on. I think it's your—your burden. 
MR. KATZ: Well, it may be my burden, 
but are you going to put a witness on? 
MS. MEYER: Depends on what you do. 
MR. KATZ: Well, I guess you won't 
know 'til I get here, then. 
MS. MEYER: Right. Certainly an 
hour, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. How about 
September 15th? 
MS. MEYER: I think I'm fine on that, 
your Honor. I don't have my calendar with me, but I 
don't think I have a conflict. 
MR. KATZ: I—I'm open that day, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Set it at 11:00 
o'clock then. 
MS. MEYER: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: And so that we avoid the 
question of surprise, Mr. Katz, by the 18th of July, can 
you designate whatever witness you're going to call for 
that? 
MR. KATZ: I may not know until I do 
that deposition, your Honor, and I mean, I—I've got a 
pretty open calendar. I'm sure I can get that deposition 
29 
scheduled, you know, like I say, a 30(b)(6) deposition in 
the next couple weeks; but that could depend on who they 
designate and various other issues. 
MS. MEYER: Your Honor, if it helps, 
I don't—I don't care if he doesn't designate State Line 
type witnesses until the end of this discovery period, as 
long as I know who— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MEYER: —he'll call on his own 
side, so that I have some opportunity for some discovery 
as well. 
THE COURT: By the 18th of July, 
designate the non-State Line people so that she has the 
chance— 
MR. KATZ: That, I can do. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you, 
Counsel. 
MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* • * 
30 
^ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the 
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed 
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 30, inclusive, to the best of my 
ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of 
December, 1997. 
>J-&llL 
^v 
Transcriber (J 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5tn day 
of December, 1997. 
/ ^ § v?<; *OT ™>y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY. UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4. 2001 
STATE OF UTAH Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
31 
1 I REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
2 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
3 J COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
5 Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
g Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
•j I Utah, do certify that I received an electronically 
Q recorded tape videotape of the within matter and caused 
o the same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 30, inclusive, to the 
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
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I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
17 party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF f M § D J S ^ & ^ f e y S ^ 
Third Judicial District 
STATE OF UTAH 
-OOo-
CHRIS BUDDENSICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE LINE HOTEL, INC., dba 
STATE LINE HOTEL AND 
CASINO, and DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
FEB 1 1 1998 
By S . Q 
"^ 3^!5x 
Case No. 970900389 PI 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
(Vjcjeotfrpe P r o c e e d i n g s ) 
- o O o -
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of 
September, 1997, the above-entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting 
as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of this 
cause, and that the following videotape proceedings were 
had. 
-oOo-
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Attorney at Law 
Siegfried & Jensen 
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Attorney at Law 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 I THE COURT: — h e r e in Case No, 
4 970900389, Buddensick vs. State Line, 
5 Counsel, if you /d make an appearance so the 
g record's complete? 
7 MR. KATZ: Michael Katz, appearing on 
g behalf of the plaintiff, your Honor, 
g MS. MEYER: Cynthia Meyer on belialf 
of the defendants. 
-J-J I THE COURT: Okay. This is a 
-12 continuation from a hearing several weeks ago, a month 
<I3 ago, relating to the question of whether the Court had 
14 | jurisdiction over a slip and fall at the casino in 
^g I Wendover. Okay. 
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Counsel, who wants t o — M r . Katz? 
]j MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. I 
just asked Cindy who really (inaudible) and she said I 
did and so I'll accept that burden, your Honor. 
I — I assume you have received our supplemental 
memorandum and that submitted by the defendant. 
THE COURT: I have and I've reviewed 
it, although I have not looked at all the exhibits, but I 
accept your representation of what they were. 
MR. KATZ: Thank you. And they are 
1 j rather lengthy, your Honor, so I—I tried to summarize 
2 i them at least in some fashion. 
3 I THE COURT: Would you push that mike 
4 down towards you? I think that camera will switch to 
5 you. Okay. Go ahead. 
g I MR. KATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
7 I—I think fairly characterized, the exhibits 
g and answers to interrogatories that were uncovered during 
g the discovery phase of this case show clearly that the 
defendant conducts a substantial and important and 
significant amount of business in the State of Utah, and 
10 
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1 2 that that business, although largely unrelated to the 
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cause of action that is the subject of this lawsuit, that 
being a slip and fall, is more than ample for this Court 
to exercise a general jurisdiction over the defendant. 
And I think the—the allegations of specific 
1 7 jurisdiction were largely covered by the original 
memorandum, so I would like to focus my comments on the 
general jurisdictional claims that we believe arise from 
the evidence produced during discovery. 
That evidence shows that in addition to 
advertising, sales and promotional-type activities that 
we relied upon during the initial filing, that here, the 
defendant, by and through various subsidiaries—and I 
won't go into these ownership issues that the—that the 
-I Court wanted us to—to avoid—but nonetheless, the 
2 documents produced show that defendant, State Line Hotel 
3 leases no less than six parcels of real property in the 
4 State of Utah from either State Line Properties, Ltd., or 
5 State Line Properties, Inc., both of which are Utah 
entities. 
7 I So, they've got agreements with Utah entities 
g as to those pieces of property, but more importantly, 
g they occupy and possess that property under these leases. 
10 They also have property under lease with the 
^ City of Wendover and consequently, although they don't 
-12 own that property, if we avoid t h i s — t h i s fuzzy gray line 
of subsidiary corporations, I — I find it frankly a 
l i t t l e — a little silly for the defendant to claim that 
they would be surprised to be hailed into court in the 
State of Utah. 
13 
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17 I If there was a dispute about any of those 
leases, about the ownership of the underlying property, 
those claims would have to be litigated in Utah. A 
Nevada court wouldn't have any jurisdiction over them 
because it involves real estate located in the State of 
Utah. We think that shows the transaction of substantial 
business in the State of Utah. 
In addition, your Honor, documents disclosed by 
the defendant shows that they have contracts with Utah 
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10 
1 companies. In addition to all of those leases that we 
2 exhibited with our memorandum, they have a contract with 
3 American Linen and they service—they service the 
4 businesses out there. 
5 Furthermore, they contract for cash register 
6 services out there, as I understand one of the other 
7 documents they produced. 
8 And finally, we have an insurance policy that 
g I not only covers State Line Hotel as the primary insured, 
it lists a number of other entities which are Utah 
-I1 I entities, we know that from other materials, but it also 
12 shows a big long list of Utah properties. 
13 J And frankly, we did not depose any of the 
officers to find out whether those were the same 
5^ I properties that are the subject of the lease, some may 
16 be, some may not be; the fact is, substantial, 
17 significant business in the State of Utah. 
I think it's kind of funny that the leases were 
also drafted by attorneys in the State of Utah, 
specifically it looked to me like Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy; that signatures were notarized by 
Utah notaries and—and your Honor—and let me represent 
18 
19 
20 
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23 me to you that I'm not only referring to the exhibits 
24 attached to our memorandum, but other leases that were 
25 produced covering Nevada properties were also drafted and 
notarized by Utah entities. 
We also know from the answers to 
interrogatories, that in fact, State Line has been hailed 
into Court in Utah in at least two other cases in the 
recent past, so they shouldn't be surprised by these 
proceedings. 
And I suppose one thing that kind of bothered 
me was some statements made by defendants during their 
initial filings, and I'd like to specifically refer to 
the affidavit of Mr. Perry. 
And it states the following: State Line Hotel 
was incorporated in the 1950's in the State of Nevada. 
By the way, those articles of incorporation were executed 
in Utah. 
And it owns property in Nevada and not in any 
state. Well, I suppose that's accurate, your Honor. But 
it sure leases a heck of a lot of property in Utah. And 
specifically, it does not own any property in Utah, it 
does own property in Wendover; it leases property in 
Utah, your Honor. 
And then it goes on to state that the business 
of the State Line Hotel, Inc., is to operate the State 
Line Hotel and Casino. Other than advertising and 
promotion of its Nevada hotel and casino, State Line 
Hotel, it does no business in Utah or neighboring states. 
/ 
10 
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1 Your Honor, I humbly submit that that is a 
2 flat-out misrepresentation. It leases properties in Utah 
3 and it does other business in Utah including business 
4 with attorneys in Utah, business with linen supply and 
5 nation—and cash register companies in Utah. This is 
g false. They lease property here, they conduct 
7 significant business here. 
g One thing I wanted to say in closing, your 
g Honor, is the cases that have been relied upon by both 
the plaintiff and defendant are really very different 
than our case and there's a unique aspect and 
2^ I circumstance of our case, which I think is an underlying 
13 current of what's gone on here. 
Bradford vs. Nagelr for instance, involves a 
Mississippi resident and a Utah corporation, and then we 
have all those advertising cases that were relied upon in 
-17 I our opening memorandum because we were talking about 
.jg advertising activities. A Pennsylvania resident gets 
ig injured at a—a Florida Walt Disney World or something 
like that. 
What we have here is a Nevada corporation that 
owns a borderline state casino, it owns the property on 
the Nevada side, leases a bunch of property on the Utah 
side. 
I don't think anybody would dispute the fact 
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that the vast bulk of its customers, clients, business is 
solicited from Utah and comes from Utah. It has numerous 
business entanglements with Utah entities, including 
wholly-owned subsidiaries; it transacts a ton of business 
here and should not be shocked, in fact, it should 
totally expect to be sued in Utah courts, including for 
claims such as the slip and fall, which is at issue in 
this case. 
On that basis, your Honor, we think the motion 
to dismiss should be denied and there are ample reasons 
and justifications for the Court to exercise jurisdiction 
over this defendant. 
THE COURT: Just as an aside, 
assuming the Court has jurisdiction, is the venue 
properly here or in— 
MR. KATZ: Well— 
THE COURT: Where? 
MR. KATZ: —that's a good question, 
your Honor. I think venue—it's arguable that —that 
because all of this property is in Tooele County, the 
leasing—excuse me, the leases are in Tooele County, in 
fact, they were recorded with the Tooele County Recorder, 
I note on a number of the documents, I think venue gets 
into a lot of convenience issues. 
And in fact, actually the jurisdiction raises 
8 
/J 
convenience issues, too, and—and a couple of the courts, 
the decisions mention that. 
When you look at convenience, I think you 
really want to—to keep the case in Salt Lake County, and 
let me—let me explain why. Most of the witnesses, 
particularly the fact witnesses, were other customers at 
the casino. They're all from Salt Lake County, and we 
know that from the accident reports that were provided. 
The plaintiff is from Salt Lake County. The 
defendant, it looks like most of their corporate officers 
are located in Salt Lake County—maybe not most, but at 
least some of them to the extent we may need to do like a 
36(b) type deposition, they're mostly in Utah. 
And I think importantly, most of the doctors 
who treated the plaintiff are located in Salt Lake County 
as well. So, I—I think that's—that's a legitimate 
reason to—to keep things in Salt Lake County. 
Thank you very much, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Meyer? 
MS. MEYER: Thank you, your Honor. 
This was set for an evidentiary hearing and the 
plaintiff chose to call no witnesses at this time, and so 
we responded. 
As the Court knows, this is a personal injury 
case that occurred on premises. It's a premises 
Q 
1 liability case. The plaintiff's injuries and cause of 
2 action don't arise out of any of the State Line's 
3 contacts with Utah and I think that plaintiff is 
4 j essentially, although maybe not completely, conceding 
that. 
g I And even in this case, if the plaintiff went to 
7 Nevada to gamble in response to advertising, there's 
g still not a connection between the advertising and the 
g injury, because that depends on something else. It's, 
10 y ° u k n o w / whether or not the defendants were maintaining 
«H their—their property in a reasonably safe manner. 
Your Honor, the—the cases that were relied on 
by plaintiff in this last brief are—are indeed very 
different from the situation that we have here. The 
12 
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.j5 cases that were relied on, t h e — t h e — o h , I can't remember 
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the name of the one, Rocka-Vaughn or something like that, 
1 7 in the last memo, and the Bradford vs. Naael. involved 
contracts between residents and non-residents, and then 
breach of contract and related causes of action arising 
out of those contracts. 
The entire analysis in both of the cases was 
under the (inaudible) statute and in this case, there is 
only jurisdiction if it—if there is general 
jurisdiction; so those cases really don't apply. 
But I do disagree with the statements that most 
10 
1 of the cases that have been relied on are really 
2 different from this case. There are some cases t h a t — 
3 that are similar and those are the cases involving 
4 really, the resort destination type of places; you know, 
5 some of the Disney cases did deal mostly with advertising 
5 a n d — a n d we're past that issue now. 
j But one of the cases that we cited earlier in 
3 either our main memorandum or our reply for the June 
g hearing is the case called Nunley vs. Second District 
10 Court. That involved the Lake Tahoe— 
^ THE COURT: Is that the O r e g o n — 
MS. MEYER: No. That was Circus 
13 I Circu? V?t PQpq, I think, 
14 THE COURT: Okay, 
15 MS. MEYER: The Nunley vs. Second 
^g j District Court is the Lake Tahoe ski area where the 
•j7 Nevada resident goes to the California side, skis at Lake 
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Tahoe, is injured, sues in Nevada and the Court says, no, 
there's not enough here for general jurisdiction, even 
though t h e — t h e ski resort itself, I think it was called 
North Star, has been a continuous member of the Reno-
Sparks, Nevada Chamber of Commerce for many years and 
advertises here and sends brochures to sports stores and 
everything else. Even though there has been that 
continuous membership of the Chamber of Commerce, that's 
11 
not enough for general jurisdiction and it didn't arise 
out of any of the contacts with Utah. 
Plaintiff says, well, yeah, but they own prop— 
or they lease property in Utah. Yeah. There are a few 
isolated parcels in Wendover, Utah, where they do lease 
some property and certainly, I think the State Line 
would—would expect to go to Court in Utah if they didn't 
pay rent or if there was some kind of a landlord-tenant 
dispute. Of course, they would expect, but that again 
arises under specific personal jurisdiction, it arises 
under the long-arm statute. 
That doesn't mean that because they may expect 
to go to Court over the lease itself, that they would 
expect to go to Court in Utah over a personal injury that 
occurred on their facility in Nevada. 
And—and what we've learned in this discovery 
is that there are isolated and transitory relationships. 
The State Line does not do business in Utah. There are 
contacts, to be sure; but it's business is operating a 
casino. I mean, that's a Nevada-type of business. 
That's the type of business that can't even be conducted 
in Utah. 
And to say that—that leasing a piece of 
property or contracting with American Linen to take care 
of the paper towel needs or the cloth towel needs as 
12 
^ 
doing business is—is stretching what is meant under the 
jurisdiction case law. 
That doing business means actually conducting 
business. This isn't Albertson's. This isn't an Idaho 
grocery store chain that has 20 grocery stores in the 
Salt Lake Valley. This isn't the Holiday Inn that has 
800 hotels. 
THE COURT: Assuming it is 
Albertson's, somebody gets hurt in a store in Boise. Can 
they sue here? 
MS. MEYER: Well, possibly. 
THE COURT: Aren't there—aren't 
there enough stores here that the general jurisdiction— 
MS. MEYER: That—that may be general 
jurisdiction here? So, because—if you do have a Utah 
resident, they may well be able to sue here; but we don't 
have that situation with the State Line. The State Line 
has its single business on the Nevada side in Wendover, 
even though they have some contacts. I have contacts 
with other states; I mean virtually all of us do. 
THE COURT: Okay. But that—if 
they're leasing property in Utah, isn't that— 
MS. MEYER: I don't think so, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Isn't that— 
13 
C -2. 
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1 MS. MEYER: They're leasing 
2 property— 
3 THE COURT: That's not even in 
4 general, that's obviously a part of their business. 
5 MS. MEYER: Well, certainly when it's 
g the—the parking lot, you bet it's part of their business 
7 and if someone got injured on the parking lot, they'd be 
3 really hard-pressed to say that they couldn't sue in Utah 
g if they were on the Utah side when they got injured; but 
they're not owning property in Utah. 
And the case law that discusses these various 
-I2 I factors talks about ownership of property. It talks 
-I3 about a stronger presence than merely leasing property. 
1 4 It talks about a stronger presence than having even a 
sales force in the foreign state. 
1g I Remember the—the case with the big long German 
1 7 name. They talked about more contact than that and the 
jurisprudence, you know, talks about substantial and 
continuous local activity as opposed to activity that is 
limited in nature and transitory in duration. 
And what we have here is very limited types of 
contacts with the State of Utah. And it's also limited 
in duration. You look at the contracts, like the 
American Linen contract, which is a 1996 contract, by the 
way, and you know, I think those contracts are usually 
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1 limited by a year period and then, you know, perhaps 
2 they're renewed, if the parties are satisfied. 
3 THE COURT: If we kept the case here, 
4 would we end up with applying Nevada law to the question 
5 of duty? 
6 MS. MEYER: Well, I would think so. 
7 It's—it's a Nevada premises case and so I — I would think 
3 that—that that would very much come into play, where we 
g have an injury on Nevada premises. 
10 j THE COURT: And is that substantially 
different or is that— 
1 2 I MS. MEYER: Well, I don't know to 
13 tell you the truth. I don't know. I—I doubt that it's 
1 4 substantially different, you know, it's—it's personal 
1 5 injury law. 
Plaintiff—plaintiff's counsel accuses the 
«I7 I State Line of—of telling falsities in—in connection 
1 8 with this motion and I—and I think that that's going a 
little bit overboard. 
When we say, we don't do business in Utah or 
the neighboring states, we're talking about the hotel and 
casino business and that's not done in other states. 
Yes, there are contacts, we've always conceded there were 
contacts in the very same affidavits the plaintiff has 
pointed to, to say that we're telling the falsehoods. 
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-I We're saying, yeah, we have other contacts, yeah, we've 
2 had contacts with, you know, w e — w e obtained some 
3 services in Salt Lake, we obtained some goods in Salt 
4 J Lake, we obtained services and goods in other states as 
well. 
g I And if you look at the entire interrogatory 
7 answers which we attached to our supplemental memorandum, 
g which was hand-delivered over on Friday, there's a list, 
g long list of contracts; in fact, I think there are 28 
contracts listed and plaintiff pulls two, the American 
H I Linen and the cash register service from Salt Lake. 
12 There are many more leases of property. 
13 T h e r e ' s — t h e r e ' s several parcels owned by State Line 
Hotel in Nevada, several other parcels owned by the State 
15 J Line Properties, the Utah entity, in Utah; but you know, 
1g we're only picking a few a n d — a n d saying, looking at 
17 these, and I suppose that's appropriate, but to say that 
12 we're telling falsehoods about where we're doing business 
i s — i s just not true and it's not fair. 
Your Honor, just i n — i n summary, I — I don't 
think that the plaintiff has met the burden of proving 
that the State Line has a substantial and continuous 
activity in Utah. There is isolated activity, it's 
limited in nature, it's limited in duration and that's 
not enough for general personal jurisdiction. 
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1 | Certainly, in certain circumstances, it would 
2 be enough for specific personal jurisdiction, but we 
3 don't have that situation here. So, we would ask that 
4 the Court dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and 
5 plaintiff can then re-file if she so chooses. 
6 THE COURT: You indicated, Counsel, 
7 that one of the parcels was—that they lease in Utah was 
3 a parking lot. Are the other parcels of similar kinds of 
g things or are they used for offices or— 
10 MS. MEYER: Let—let me tell you what 
^ they are. I don't know what they're all used for, but I 
«I2 do have a list of what they are. 
13 Of the—the leases that were identified by 
<I4 plaintiff in the supplemental memorandum, Exhibit B, and 
I'm not sure what it—what it was, was not entered into 
until about a year after plaintiff's fall, so I didn't 
15 
16 
17 find out what it even was. 
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Exhibit C is a lease for a duplex in Wendover, 
Utah. Exhibit D is a lease for two warehouse buildings 
in Wendover, Utah. Exhibit E is the parking lot 
property. Exhibit—I'm sorry for rattling papers— 
Exhibit F is an eight-tenths of an acre lot in Utah and 
it's used for parking lot, parking structure and the—the 
cowboy sign. I don't know if you're familiar with that. 
And Exhibit G is a lease for storage space out at the old 
17 
1 Decker Field, just some storage units that they have out 
2 there at the old Air Force facility, which the City of 
3 Wendover now owns. That's it. 
4 There's, you know, the parking lot property 
5 certainly would be connected. I don't know if the others 
g are connected with the business or not, but they're 
7 l really fairly minor properties all in—in the locale, in 
g Wendover, just on the Utah side. They're not leasing 
9 property, in other words, in Orem or Provo or St. George 
<IQ or other places, other than right there by their 
^ i business. 
12 I THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
13 
14 
15 
Mr. Katz? 
MR. KATZ: Just a couple things, your 
Honor. 
-jg I Number one, in terms of continuous versus 
17 transitory, the articles of incorporation which were 
entered into in Utah, signed in Utah, notarized in Utah, 
were adopted in 1950. That's 47 years of activity in 
Utah. 
I pulled one of the leases. This is Exhibit— 
sorry, your Honor—Exhibit F, for instance. A 20-year 
lease. That's—that's pretty continuous, your Honor. 
And the properties, themselves. A parking 
structure for the casino, a sign for the casino, that's 
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1 I pretty darn closely-related to its casino business, your 
2 i Honor, 
3 I I think we've met our burden. It—it—it— 
4 there's—there's a lot there, there is. They send their 
5 initial filing, that State Line Properties, Inc. owns a 
6 half-acre parcel of real property. That's all. They— 
7 j they were—they admitted a half-acre parcel of property; 
3 sorry, I count a minimum of six. 
9 This is—this is plenty. I'm—I'll submit it 
1Q on that basis, your Honor. Thank you, 
-I-I THE COURT: Okay. 
-12 Ms* MEYER: Your Honor, may I clarify 
13 one thing? 
14 j THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. MEYER: The affidavit that's 
being referred to as the initial filing was not filed in 
15 
16 
17 this case, it was filed in another case; but that aside, 
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the entity that's being identified as owning a half-acre 
parcel of property in Wendover, Utah, is state Line 
Properties, Inc. It's not the entity that we're dealing 
with at all— 
THE COURT: I understand that. 
MS. MEYER: —so I think it's 
irrelevant. 
THE COURT: And I think Mr. Katz 
19 
-I understood that, too, 
2 MR. KATZ: I—I did, your Honor. I 
3 didn't mean to imply that it was the State Line Hotel. 
4 No, I knew it was State Line Properties. 
5 THE COURT: I'm going to grant the 
g motion to dismiss. 
7 Let me state for the record that I don't 
3 believe it is a foreign non-convenience proper—problem, 
9 like Mr. Katz has made very clear that convenience of 
10 participants, that the litigating firms, that the 
-j-I principals, all have plenty of contact with Utah such 
12 that it may in fact be the most convenient place to try 
13 J the case. So, it's clearly not a foreign non-convenient 
kind of an issue, 
15 I But I think it's a close call whether the 
16 leasing of parcels of property in Utah, and I'm going to 
17 find for the record, it's sufficiently continuous that 
18 the continuity is not the issue either. That the parking 
19 J lot, the sign, I think clearly have been there, the 
2Q | contemplation is that they will continue to be there for 
2-| j an extended period of time, those are directly related to 
14 
22 
24 
25 
the casino business. 
23 If it were simply storage space at the airport 
or a warehouse that may change, that would be more 
tenuous; but I,m not even relying on those. 
20 
1 I think the leasing of incidental parcels, and 
2 in that, I am including the signage and the parking 
3 structure and the parking lot. While those are clearly 
4 directly related to the carrying on of a casino business, 
5 they're not integral in the sense that the casino could 
g not, in some fashion or another, continue* 
7 The leasing of those parcels is insufficient to 
g convey general jurisdiction such that the defendants are 
g liable for all of their actions to any Utah plaintiff in 
a Utah court. 
11 I Certainly, if one of the leased parcels was the 
12 sight of the slip and fall, that would be sufficient; but 
I guess I'm just troubled by a slip and fall occurring in 
Nevada, resulting in jurisdiction in Utah when there is 
15 I not a generalized presence in Utah. 
1g I tried to make that sufficiently clear, Mr. 
17 | Katz, that you can take it up for simplified review 
12 I without a great deal of expenditure of funds to do that, 
10 
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and find out if I'm correct or not. I certainly have 
enough question in my own mind that I'm not sure that 
you're not going to get a reversal on that; but for the 
record, are there things that you want clarified, so that 
you can bring up a simple record to the Appeals Court? 
MR. KATZ: I think if there were any 
questions about it, we can—we can get it off the 
21 
transcript. I can't think of any major points raised 
that you didn't address, although we did mention the 
advertising, solicitation. 
THE COURT: And as I indicated at the 
last hearing, I don't think the advertisement and 
solicitation by itself are sufficient to get that 
generalized jurisdiction. 
And without evidence showing that she was 
following up on one of those trips or other things that 
they plan and that they market, the ties are 
insufficient. 
Ms. Meyer, anything that you want on the 
record? 
MS. MEYER: No. Nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Meyer, if 
you'll draw the order and the findings then, submit that 
to Mr. Katz for approval as to form. 
MS. MEYER: I will, your Honor. Can 
we—will you require findings, or will the findings on 
the record be sufficient? 
THE COURT: I think for purposes of 
making sure that Mr. Katz has the right to take it 
clearly to the Court of Appeal, we ought to put it in a 
set of findings. 
MS. MEYER: Okay. 
22 
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THE COURT: So that they don't have 
2 I to transcribe that to present the issue. I would think 
3 I that it could be done fairly simply and the Court of 
4 I Appeals can simply issue a ruling that I'm either out to 
lunch or I'm close. 
g I Okay. Anything else? 
7 MR. KATZ: Nothing I can think of, 
g your Honor. 
g THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, 
Counsel. Court will be in recess. 
11 I MS. MEYER: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the 
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed 
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 24, inclusive, to the best of my 
ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of 
December, 1997. 
W(C/^C HJU, ^ -
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5t-'1 day 
of December, 1997. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
OEC. 4. 2001 
STATE OF UTAH Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the 
same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 23, inclusive, to the 
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this lot'"1 day of 
December, 1997. 
NOTARY PUBLIC" 
„ A L A N P. SMITH 
MURRAY. UT 84107 i 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4. 2001 ' 
• , STATFncir rAu 
A I 
Notary Public 
/ f '''r^^/. 
( S E A L ) 
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EXHIBIT"E 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7888 
Fax number: (801) 531-9732 
Attorneys foi Dt*fcii,!,ii'/ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
A k t COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS BUDDENSICK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATELINE CASINO, INC., dba 
STATELINE HOTEL AND CASINO, 
and DOES I-X, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPO>bL TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION-
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 9709003891PI 
Judse William A. Thorne 
Defendant 'M.itc ' >nc H^t^i ITK.. hv and tiiu'iigh its attorneys of record, submits 
the following responsive memorandum to Plaintiffs September 11, 1997, Supplemental 
.\\-n>-~>.' - ' • . T t ' < - Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
RESPONSE I P LNDISPL ILi? i \CTS 
(d) Exhibit E to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum is for a parking lot in 
Wendover, Utah. 
(e) Exhibit F to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum is for a 0.8 acre lot in 
Wendover, Utah, with monthly rental ranging from $1,200 to S2,500 per month 
over the life of the lease. The lot is leased for a parking lot, parking structure and 
business sign. 
(f) Exhibit G to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum is a lease with the City of 
Wendover for storage space at Decker Field in Wendover, Utah, for S100 per 
month. 
3. The fact that an insurance policy insures related entities is irrelevant to the 
determination whether this court has personal jurisdiction over the Nevada entity, State Line 
Hotel, Inc., in this action. 
4. Defendant's answers to interrogatories notes only two Utah post office boxes. 
The other post office box noted in the answers is at the new Wendover, Nevada, post office, as 
indicated during the June 30, 1997, hearing. In addition, the only way to contact the facility at 
which Plaintiff was allegedly injured, is by calling a Nevada telephone number. Importantly, in 
Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiff again does not limit her question to the time of the accident, but 
only asks about addresses and telephone numbers in the last five years which includes the present 
3 
time. It is irrelevant that the Utah entities, State Line Properties, ' rv. ' td, used a Utah post 
office box. 
5. Plaintiffs statements that "[n]early every agreement entered into by the 
Defendant, including the leases and contracts noted above, show they were executed and 
notarized in Salt Laki i"n\ i lab" and that they were drafted by Utah attorneys, is terribly 
misleading (if not downright false): 
•Exhibit A (the American Linen contract and Retail Control Systems invoice) do 
not mdiente where they were executed or who drafted them. 
•Exhibit B is the only document which indicates that it was executed in Salt Lake 
C lty and drafted by Salt Lake City attorneys. 
•Exhibit C does not indicate where it was executed or who drafted it. 
•Exhibit D does not indicate where it was executed or who drafted it. 
•Exhibit F was notarized hv a Nevada notary (unclear as to where it was executed) 
and otherwise does not indicated who drafted it. 
•Exhibit F was signed and notarized in Nevada. 
•Exhibit G does not indicate wlitTr it n as executed i «i v\ ho dratted it but does 
indicate that it is made and construed under the laws of Utah. 
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